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PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE PROBLEMS
WITH USING PATENT LAW PROPOSALS TO
COMBAT ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
The discovery of penicillin and sulfonamide in the 1930s and 1940s
allowed for the quick and easy treatment of bacterial infections that
were once life-threatening.1 However, shortly after antibiotics came
into widespread use, bacteria began resisting their effects. 2 Unfortu-
nately, when bacteria become resistant to a particular antibiotic, the
antibiotic is no longer effective against that bacteria.3 Antibiotic resis-
tance is now a serious threat to global public health.4 Although alter-
ing patent law has been suggested as a way to ameliorate this problem,
it is unlikely to effectively do so.
Antibiotic resistance can result in longer illness and even death if
there are no antibiotics that can target the bacteria that caused the
infection. 5 Antibiotic resistance comes at a high cost to society be-
cause antibiotic-resistant infections increase medical expenses and de-
crease productivity. 6 Faced with the serious repercussions of
antibiotic resistance, public health authorities encourage the conserva-
tion of existing antibiotics and the development of more novel antibi-
1. See Otto Cars & Per Nordberg, Antibiotic Resistance-The Faceless Threat, in THE GLOBAL
THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: EXPLORING ROADS TOWARDS CONCERTED ACTION 1
(2004), available at http://www.dhf.uu.se/antibiotics-participant/new-pdf/Faceless-Threat.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A Call to Action
for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46 CLINICAL INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASES 155, 155 (2008), available at www.idsociety.org/WorkArea/DownloadAs-
set.aspx?id=9048 ("We are in the midst of an emerging crisis of antibiotic resistance for
microbial pathogens in the United States and throughout the world.").
5. See Thomas G. Slama, Gram-Negative Antibiotic Resistance: There Is a Price to Pay, 12
CRITICAL CARE S4, S7 (2008), available at http://ccforum.com/content/pdf/cc6820.pdf
("[P]atients infected with resistant strains of key Gram-negative pathogens have increased mor-
tality [and] longer hospital stays ... than those infected by [antibiotic] susceptible strains."); B.
Spellberg et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension Legislation to
Spur Critically Needed Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167, 168 (2007) ("[U]p to seven-
teen days of extra hospitalization due to infection caused by a multi-drug resistant versus a non-
multi-drug-resistant P. aeruginosa [a Gram-negative bacteria].").
6. See Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 169 tbl.1 (factoring reduced indirect costs, such as lost
productivity, as a societal saving from a novel antibiotic).
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otics.7 Conserving antibiotics involves limiting the use of antibiotics
to situations in which they are absolutely necessary. This aims to de-
lay the onset and spread of antibiotic resistance. 8 Developing novel
antibiotics ensures that when existing antibiotics are no longer effec-
tive, new antibiotics that are capable of treating the resistant bacteria
are available. 9 However, conservation has not been successful, 10 and
the development of novel antibiotics continues to stagnate."
In recent years, public health authorities and scientists have ex-
pressed concern about the decline in the research and development of
novel antibiotics.' 2 To rectify the situation, they suggest providing ad-
ditional financial incentives to drug developers, 3 including tax credits
and longer patent terms. 14 Recent congressional proposals have also
sought to encourage antibiotic development by offering patent-based
incentives, such as extended patent terms for novel antibiotics. 15
7. See Spellberg et al., supra note 4, at 157 ("Clearly, it is desirable to use antibiotics only
when appropriate, to try to limit selective pressure that increases the frequency of resistance.");
Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 167.
8. See Spellberg et al., supra note 4, at 157.
9. LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE 430-31 (1994) (discussing how physicians
switched to new classes of antibiotics when older classes were no longer working and that
"[piharmaceutical companies were searching for radically different ways of attacking the mi-
crobes."); cf. Cars & Nordberg, supra note 1, at 4 ("[B]ecause of the previously continuous
development of new antibacterial agents it has been possible, in countries where new drugs are
affordable, to change the therapy to new antibiotics when resistance levels to older ones have
become 'uncomfortably high."'); INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC'Y OF AM., BAD BUGS, No DRUGS:
As ANTIBIOTIC DISCOVERY STAGNATES ... A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 1, 3 (July 2004)
[hereinafter BAD BUGS] ("Until recently, research and development (R&D) efforts have pro-
vided new drugs in time to treat bacteria that became resistant to older antibiotics.").
10. See Arch G. Mainous III et al., An Evaluation of Statewide Strategies to Reduce Antibiotic
Overuse, 32 FAMILY MED. 22, 28 (2000).
11. See Allison E. Aiello et al., Antimicrobial Resistance and the Ethics of Drug Development,
96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 1910, 1910 (2006) ("[D]evelopment of new classes of antimicrobials has
been at a virtual standstill since the late 1970s."); Martin L. Katz et al., Where Have All the
Antibiotic Patents Gone?, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1529, 1529 (2006) ("[P]harma companies
are developing fewer antibiotics in comparison with other therapeutic categories.").
12. See Spellberg et al., supra note 4, at 155.
13. See Slama, supra note 5, at S5 ("Large pharmaceutical companies will only develop new
antimicrobial agents if the federal government provides financial incentives through better pat-
ent protection or acceptable reimbursement rates.").
14. See Aiello et al., supra note 11, at 1912 ("The public sector could provide additional incen-
tives (market exclusivity, patent extension, tax incentives, and expedient Food and Drug Admin-
istration approval times) and mitigation of risks (indemnification against liability and guaranteed
markets) to the private sector in return for the successful development of new drugs."); BAD
BUGS, supra note 9, at 3 ("[I]ncentives most likely to spur R&D within major pharmaceutical
companies include those that provide financial benefits prior to a drug's approval (e.g., tax cred-
its for R&D).").
15. See S. 975, 109th Cong. § 202 (2005) (proposing an addition to Title III of the Public
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 243, which requires that those countermeasures eligible for a patent term
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Many scientists and politicians believe that patent-based incentives
would persuade drug developers to invest in antibiotic development.' 6
This Comment argues that, contrary to these beliefs, the patent law
system further exacerbates the problem of antibiotic resistance. 17 The
patent bargain between the inventor and society functions differently
for antibiotics than other inventions.18 Generally, the inherent useful-
ness of an invention is not altered by an inventor's incentive to exploit
the value of the invention while it is being protected by the patent. 19
However, the exploitation of antibiotics leads to overuse of the antibi-
otic and can result in antibiotic resistance.20 In addition, from a public
health perspective, the optimal use of antibiotics involves delaying the
introduction of new antibiotics until existing antibiotics are ineffec-
tive.21 This waiting period is incompatible with a patent structure that
grants a limited monopoly to an inventor as soon as the inventor ap-
plies for a patent.22
Thus, patent law cannot effectively solve the problem of antibiotic
resistance because patent law does not encourage the development of
antibiotics or the conservation of existing antibiotics.2 3 Consequently,
Congress will not encourage the development of novel antibiotics that
affect antibiotic-resistant bacteria by granting patent term extensions
to antibiotic developers.2 4 Yet even if antibiotic conservation within
the United States could be attained by altering patent law, the use and
overuse of antibiotics in other countries would still lead to resistance
in the United States.2 5
The most effective way to slow antibiotic resistance involves closely
regulating antibiotic use and cycling the use of certain antibiotics over
extension include "biological and chemical agents, toxins, and nuclear and radiological materials
that may be used as weapons of mass destruction or that are infectious diseases.").
16. See Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 167 ("Wild-card patent extension appears to be a cost-
effective strategy to spur anti-infective development.").
17. See infra notes 122-135 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
19. BAD Bucs, supra note 9, at 17 ("Antibiotics and other antimicrobials are the only drugs
where extensive use leads to loss of benefit.").
20. Mainous et al., supra note 10, at 22 ("Overuse of antibiotics has been linked to rates of
antibiotic resistance."); cf. BAD Buos, supra note 9, at 17 ("[E]xtensive use leads to loss of
benefit.").
21. See infra notes 255-260 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 122-135 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 246-264 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 155-237 and accompanying text.
25. See Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceuti-
cal Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PiTr. L. REv. 67, 93, 100 (2005).
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a long period of time.26 Unfortunately, these measures would further
decrease novel antibiotic development because drug developers would
have little financial incentive to develop antibiotics. 27 In turn, the
problems posed by antibiotic resistance would grow because, regard-
less of how carefully existing antibiotics are used, resistance makes the
development of novel antibiotics necessary. 28 Instead, the govern-
ment should pursue antibiotic development itself, to ensure that suffi-
cient antibiotic development takes place, and to ensure that those
developed antibiotics are conserved appropriately.
Part II of this Comment explores the causes of antibiotic resistance,
the reasons why it poses a significant danger to health and welfare, the
statutory patent term in the United States, and the recent attempts to
reform patent law by extending the patent term.29 Part III argues that
recent proposals to alter patent law would not solve antibiotic resis-
tance.30 Part IV discusses non-patent-related proposals and argues
that the government should pursue antibiotic research itself.31
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides an overview of the causes of antibiotic resistance,
current patent law, and patent law proposals pertaining to antibiotics.
Section A discusses the biological and epidemiological causes of an-
tibiotic resistance, the public health threat that antibiotic resistance
poses, and the reasons that antibiotic development has stagnated. 32
Section B discusses current patent term extensions available for novel
drugs, recent legislation seeking to extend the patent term, and recent
legislation that institutes a patent prize system for pharmaceuticals
companies. 33
26. Matthew S. Dryden et al., Antibiotic Stewardship-More Education and Regulation Not
More Availability?, 64 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 885, 887 (2009), available at http://
jac.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/dkp305vl ("How can the dilemma of optimal treatment for in-
dividuals and at the same time reduction in the volume of antibiotic use, thereby reducing the
selective pressure on bacterial ecology be resolved? Probably the only way is to have more, not
less, regulation of the use of antibiotics."); Rekha Murthy, Implementation of Strategies to Con-
trol Antimicrobial Resistance, 119 CHEST 405S, 409S ("Specific measures to manage antimicro-
bial resistance by modifying patterns of antibiotic use may include restriction of certain classes of
antibiotics, rotating or cycling classes of antibiotics periodically, or open fomularies.") (emphasis
added).
27. See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
28. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 69.
29. See infra notes 32-108 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 109-264 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 265-268 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 64-108 and accompanying text.
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A. Antibiotic Resistance
Bacterial and human cells use similar cellular structures and path-
ways to operate.34 In order to target bacterial cells without harming
human cells, antibiotics target bacterial structures or pathways that
humans lack. 35 By doing so, the antibiotic can destroy the bacteria
without hurting the human who takes the antibiotic. Because human
and bacterial cells are similar, it is difficult to find an agent that can
effectively target the bacterial structure or pathway without harming
the human cells. Due to the limited number of agents that can accom-
plish this goal, numerous antibiotics have similar chemical structures
that target the same bacterial structure or pathway.36
Many successful antibiotics were discovered by observing how other
organisms, such as fungi, inhibit the growth of bacteria. 37 Antibiotics
discovered from these natural sources are very effective against bacte-
ria because the natural sources have been fighting bacteria for more
than two billion years.38 However, bacteria have been exposed to the
bacteria-fighting properties of those natural sources for an equally
long period of time. As a result, when those antibiotics were discov-
ered, strains of bacteria that could resist the antibiotics emerged al-
most immediately,39 due to both the natural evolution of bacteria and
the overuse and misuse of antibiotics.40 Because of this long-term ex-
posure, bacteria that can resist antibiotics are the most likely to sur-
vive. 41 Humans have accelerated this evolution by exposing bacteria
34. See DAVID L. NELSON & MICHAEL M. Cox, LEHNINGER PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY 6
(4th ed. 2005).
35. For example, penicillin targets an enzyme that is critical to effective bacterial cell wall
synthesis but that is absent in humans. Id. at 779.
36. For example, penicillin and amoxicillin have similar structures and target the same bacte-
rial structure. Thus, they are considered to be members of the same class of antibiotic-the
beta-lactam class. See Tami Port, MOA of Penicillin Antibiotics, Apr. 20, 2009, http://bacteriol-
ogy.suitel01.com/article.cfm/moa-of-penicillin-antibiotics. (last visited Aug. 7, 2009)
37. For example, penicillin was discovered by observing the ability of a certain fungus to in-
hibit the growth of bacteria. See Am. Chem. Soc'y., The Discovery and Development of Penicil-
lin, http://acswebcontent.acs.org/landmarks/landmarks/penicillin/discover.html (last visited Aug.
7, 2009).
38. See Spellberg et al., supra note 4, at 157 ("Genetic analysis of microbial metabolic path-
ways indicates that microbes invented both B-lactam antibiotics and B-lactamase enzymes to
resist those antibiotics >2 billion years ago.").
39. See Aiello et al., supra note 11, at 1910 ("Shortly after the widespread use of penicillin that
followed World War II, penicillin-resistant strains of S aureus [a bacteria] began to emerge in
hospitals.").
40. See Spellberg et al., supra note 4, at 156-57.
41. Id. at 157 ("[M]icrobes have had collective experience creating and defeating antibiotics
.... Microbes do not need our help in creating antibiotic resistance.").
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to "thousands of metric tons of antibiotics ... used in patients and
livestock over the past half century. '42
The rise in antibiotic-resistant infections has serious health implica-
tions.43 Infectious diseases are the second leading global cause of
death.44 In the United States, infectious diseases are the third leading
cause of death.45 These statistics are likely to increase as antibiotic-
resistant infections become more prevalent because antibiotic-resis-
tant infections cause a higher mortality rate46 and a higher risk of sec-
ondary complications than antibiotic-susceptible infections. 47  In
addition to the loss of human life, antibiotic resistance costs billions of
healthcare dollars because antibiotic-resistant infections take longer
to cure and often require the use of more expensive drugs.48
When a bacterial infection is resistant to a particular antibiotic, the
infection must be treated by a different antibiotic. 49 However, in
many instances, the resistant bacteria is also resistant to other classes
42. Id.
43. See Slama, supra note 5, at S4 ("[P]atients infected with resistant strains of key ... patho-
gens have increased mortality, longer hospital stays, and higher hospital costs than those infected
by [antibiotic] susceptible strains.").
44. See Brad Spellberg et al., Trends in Antimicrobial Drug Development- Implications for the
Future, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279, 1279 (2004).
45. Id.
46. See Cars & Nordberg, supra note 1, at 4 (2004) ("[M]ortality is repeatedly being shown to
be two to three times higher than in infections with non-resistant strains.").
47. Id.
48. GARRETT, supra note 9, at 411-13 (noting that once bacteria became resistant to penicil-
lin, doctors started prescribing methicillin, which "increased drug treatment costs for a typical
patient approximately tenfold; turning to vancomycin meant turning to one of the most expen-
sive antibiotics on the market."); Jill U. Adams, Fewer Respiratory Infections Treated with An-
tibiotics, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009 ("[A]ntibiotics that are developed to combat resistant
bacteria are generally more expensive."); World Health Organization, Antimicrobial Resistance,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs194/en (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) ("When infec-
tions become resistant to first-line antimicrobials, treatment has to be switched to second- or
third-line drugs, which are nearly always more expensive."); cf George H. Talbot et. al., Bad
Bugs Need Drugs: An Update on the Development Pipeline from the Antimicrobial Availability
Task Force of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 657,
658 (2006) ("[T]he toll of antimicrobial resistance: the loss of thousands of lives and the avoida-
ble cost of billions of health care dollars.").
49. See HUMANE Soc'y U.S., AN HSUS REPORT: HUMAN HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF NON-
THERAPEUTIC ANTIBIOTIC USE IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE 1, 3 (2009), available at http://
www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/HSUS-Human-Health-Report-on-Antibiotics-in-Animal-Ag-
riculture.pdf ("[T]housands of patients with Campylobacter who sought medical treatment were
initially treated with an antibiotic to which the bacteria was resistant, forcing the doctors to
switch to more powerful drugs."); cf. GARRETT, supra note 9, at 411-12 (describing how physi-
cians, when faced with resistant strains of Staphylococcus aureus, "switched en masse from peni-
cillin to methicillin during the late 1960s"); Steven J. Projan & Patricia A. Bradford, Late Stage
Antibacterial Drugs in the Clinical Pipeline, 10 CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOOY 441, 441
(2007) ("In the past physicians could reliably treat such infections with beta-lactam antibiotics,
however this is no longer the case.").
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of antibiotics. 50 Thus, despite the number of antibiotics currently
available, "only the development of new classes of antimicrobials with
novel mechanisms of action can fully address the burgeoning drug re-
sistance in common pathogens. ' '51 Experts fear that if antibiotic resis-
tance continues to rise, antibiotics may become completely obsolete. 52
While the need for novel classes of antibiotics is clear, drug devel-
opers increasingly choose to research chronic diseases and so-called
lifestyle diseases in lieu of developing novel antibiotics. Few novel
antibiotics are being developed 53 because it has become increasingly
expensive to research, develop, and obtain Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) approval for novel drugs in general.54 In addition to
increased research and development costs, antibiotics are less likely to
be profitable than drugs that treat chronic diseases.55 Unlike drugs
for chronic diseases, "antimicrobials are used for very short periods
and are used relatively infrequently. ' 56 Bacteria can quickly grow re-
sistant to novel antibiotics and make the antibiotic all but useless, un-
like drugs for chronic diseases, which do not become obsolete because
of resistance. 57 Because it takes an average of eight years to introduce
a novel drug into the market 58 and an average of ten years to intro-
duce an antibiotic into the market,59 the lack of novel antibiotics cur-
50. For example, antibiotic resistance is often transmitted from one bacteria to another. See
Andrew Morris et al., The Superbugs: Evolution, Dissemination and Fitness, 1 CURRENT OPIN-
ION MICROBIOLOGY 524, 525 (1998). Oftentimes, resistance to more than one antibiotic is trans-
ferred. Id. Some bacteria can resist multiple types of antibiotics with the same mechanism. See
Hiroshi Nikaido, Multiple Antibiotic Resistance and Efflux, 1 CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY
516, 516 (1998).
51. Spellberg et al., supra note 44, at 1282.
52. See Robert E.W. Hancock & David Knowles, Editorial Overview, Are We Approaching
the End of the Antibiotic Era?, 1 CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 493 (1998) ("If we do not
reverse the current trends by judicious use of existing and new antimicrobial agents, we stand the
risk of seeing the antibiotic era as a footnote in human history.").
53. See, e.g., Aiello et al., supra note 11, at 1910 ("Only 2 new classes of antibiotics have been
introduced during the past 24 years."); Katz, supra note 11, at 1529 ("[O]ut of the more than 506
drugs in development, only five were new antibiotics .... Since 1998, only nine antibiotics or
new uses of old antibiotics have been approved by the FDA, and only six antibiotics are in phase
2 or phase 3 clinical trials.").
54. The estimated cost of developing an approved pharmaceutical agent ranges from $400
million to $800 million. Spellberg et al., supra note 44, at 1279.
55. See Talbot et al., supra note 48, at 657 ("For these larger companies, discovery and clinical
development of novel anti-infective agents incurs substantial financial disincentives largely re-
lated to the relatively low return on investment that is intrinsic to anti-infective drug
development.").
56. Aiello et al., supra note 11, at 1911.
57. Id. ("[D]rugs for chronic conditions ... will not be shelved; consumers can use them for
years or decades, and they rarely become ineffective as a consequence of repeated use.").
58. Spellberg et al., supra note 44, at 1282.
59. BAD Buos, supra note 9, at 22.
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rently in development means that there will be a continuing shortage
of antibiotics.60 Furthermore, the market for novel antibiotics is
small, especially in comparison to the market for drugs that treat
chronic diseases.61
Many bacterial infections are susceptible to several different antibi-
otics. 62 For those infections, older, off-patent, and cheaper antibiotics
can effectively fight the infection. Thus, there is no need to use a
more expensive novel antibiotic. 63 While using off-patent antibiotics
conserves novel antibiotics and prevents antibiotic resistance, it
reduces the market for novel antibiotics, and thus, it reduces the profit
potential of novel antibiotics.
B. The Patent Term and Patent Prizes
The term of a U.S. patent, including patents for antibiotics, is
twenty years from the date of the patent application. 64 Currently,
there are three statutes that can extend the patent term for certain
drugs beyond the twenty-year statutory period or confer a period of
market exclusivity: the Hatch-Waxman Act,65 the Orphan Drug
Act,66 and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act.67 Recently,
proposed legislation sought to extend the patent term for certain in-
60. See Spellberg et al., supra note 44, at 1282 ("[Tlhe decline in antibacterial research and
development is [greater than or equal to] one decade old.").
61. Id. at 1279-80 (discussing the factors contributing to the decline in antibiotic
development).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The statute states the following:
Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a term beginning
on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a
specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under section 120, 121,
or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
65. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) (2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)), as
amended by Title IX of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)
(2006) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2006)).
66. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 360aa-ee (1998)).
67. Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.).
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ventions that relate to bioterrorism and infectious disease outbreaks,68
but those legislative bills were not enacted into law.69
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, was enacted in 1984.70 Under the
Act, if a patented drug's entry into the market is delayed by FDA
regulatory review, the time lost is restored to the patent term. 71 The
time period that can be restored under the Hatch-Waxman Act is sub-
ject to two limitations: (1) the amount of time added to the patent
cannot exceed five years,72 and (2) the total amount of time remaining
on the patent cannot exceed fourteen years.73 Although the Hatch-
Waxman Act was enacted in 1984, its patent provisions did not begin
to apply to antibiotics until 1997. 74 Research demonstrates that the
Hatch-Waxman Act has not resulted in increased research and devel-
opment of novel antibiotics. 75
The Orphan Drug Act grants a seven-year period of market exclu-
sivity and tax credits to the developer of a drug that treats a rare dis-
68. See Protecting America in the War on Terror Act of 2005, S. 3, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 975,
109th Cong. § 301 (2005).
69. See http://govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bill=sl09-3 (last visited Aug. 5, 2009) (indicating
that S. 3 never became law); http://govtrack.us/congressbill.xpd?bill=s109-975 (last visited Aug.
5, 2009) (indicating that S. 975 never became law).
70. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FooD & DRUG L.J. 187, 188 (1999).
71. "The term of a patent eligible for extension under subsection (a) shall be extended by the
time equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product which period occurs after
the date the patent is issued .... " 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2006) ("[T]he period of extension determined on the basis of
the regulatory review period determined under any such paragraph may not exceed five years.").
73. For example, if the patent term has eleven years left to run and the patent would other-
wise be entitled to a four-year patent term restoration under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patent
could only receive a three-year patent term restoration. Id.
74. Prior to the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115, antibiotics were treated differently during regulation by the
FDA.
Prior to FDAMA, antibiotics were approved under § 507 of FDCA, Pub. L. No. 105-
155, 111 Stat. 2327 (1997), and most other drugs were approved under § 505 of the
FDCA. Drugs approved under § 505 were eligible for the data and patent protections
provided by Hatch-Waxman .... FDAMA eliminated this distinction for antibiotics
and other drugs approved after its effective date, Nov. 21, 1997.
Gregory J. Glover, Boosting Innovation in Antibiotics, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 2008, at 1, 2, available
at http://www.pharmalawgrp.comlpdffNational%20Law%2OJournal.pdf; see also Julie Dohm,
Expanding the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act's Patent Carve-Out Exception to the Identical
Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent Litigation Loophole, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 151, 165
(2007) ("In 1997, Congress repealed section 507 and subjected antibiotic drug approvals to sec-
tion 505 of the FDCA. This revision made antibiotics eligible, for the first time, for section 505's
patent and nonexclusivity provisions.").
75. See Aiello, supra note 11, at 1910 ("[D]evelopment of new classes of antimicrobials has
been at a virtual standstill since the late 1970s.").
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ease.76 The Act was deemed necessary because existing financial
incentives were insufficient to encourage the development of drugs
that treat rare diseases.77 This Act could be used to encourage the
development of an antibiotic for relatively rare bacterial infections or
antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections that affect fewer than 200,000.
Likewise, the Act could encourage the development of antibiotics
when a developer cannot expect to recoup its investment. Unfortu-
nately, few antibiotic developers have utilized this Act, which suggests
that the Act does not adequately encourage research and develop-
ment into novel antibiotics. 78
In 2002, Congress enacted the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children
Act (BPCA) to encourage pharmaceutical companies to test the
safety and reliability of their drugs for children. 79 The BPCA grants a
six-month patent term extension to a complying pharmaceutical com-
pany.80 In order for a patentee to quality for an extension, the FDA
must determine that pediatric research for the effects of the drug
would be beneficial. 81 If the patentee agrees to perform a pediatric
study within a specified time period, the patentee receives the six-
month extension.82 The BCPA was reenacted in 2007.83
In 2005, two bills-the Protecting America in the War on Terror
Act of 2005 and the Project BioShield II Act of 2005-proposed the
extension of the drug patent term for some drugs; neither of the Acts
76. The Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2006), states the following:
[I]f the Secretary-
(1) approves an application filed pursuant to section 355 of this title, or
(2) issues a license under section 262 of Title 42 for a drug designated under section
360bb of this title for a rare disease or condition, the Secretary may not approve an-
other application under section 355 of this title or issue another license under section
262 of Title 42 for such drug for such disease or condition for a person who is not the
holder of such approved application or of such license until the expiration of seven
years from the date of the approval of the approved application or the issuance of the
license.
77. OOPD Program Overview, http://www.fda.gov/orphan/progovw.htm (last visited Aug. 10,
2009).
78. A search of the drugs designated as "orphan drugs" by the FDA via its website, http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/index.cfm, returned two drugs under the search
term "antibiotic" and two drugs under the term "antimicrobial." "Antibiotic" and "antimicro-
bial" were searched under "Orphan Designation" by applying the earliest possible start date
(January 1, 1983) and an end date of August 16, 2009. A search for all orphan drug designations
for the same date range (i.e., not restricting by "Orphan Designation") returned 2,034 drugs.
79. Lisa Jerles, Note, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and the Pediatric Research
Equity Act-Helping or Hurting America's Children?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. PoL'Y & ETHics J.
515, 516-17 (2008).
80. Id. at 518.
81. Id. at 518.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 519.
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were enacted.84  Senator Judd Gregg introduced the Protecting
America in the War on Terror Act.85 The legislation aimed to im-
prove the United States' ability to counter bioterrorism, 86 and it in-
cluded a provision intended to "provide patent incentives to certain
entities to protect inventions from expropriation by competitors and
to provide an incentive for capital formation to fund countermeasures
and vaccine research. ' 87 The bill also proposed the granting of patent
term extensions that equaled the number of days that successful
counter-bioterrorism measures spent in regulatory review.8 8 Addi-
tionally, the bill included a provision that grants a two-year patent
term extension.89 However, the legislative language is unclear as to
whether the extension would be applied specifically to the qualifying
countermeasure or whether the pharmaceutical company could apply
the extension to a different drug.90 While antibiotics that target resis-
tant bacteria are not specifically mentioned as a potential countermea-
sure, these antibiotics would likely be eligible. 91 The Senate did not
take any action on this bill.92
Likewise, Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the Project Bio-
Shield II Act of 2005. 93 This bill aimed to encourage research that
could lead to the development of countermeasures against biological,
chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons, as well as infectious dis-
ease outbreaks. 94 Part of the proposed legislation encouraged re-
84. See Office Legislative Pol'y & Analysis, Legislative Updates, http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legisla-
tion/109/pendinglegislation/bioterror.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2009).
85. See S. 3, 109th Cong. (2005).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 113(a).
88. Id. § 113(c); see Jeffrey Light, BioShield II Proposal Would Hurt Seniors, Uninsured in the
Name of Homeland Security, PATIENTS NOT PATENTS, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.patientsnot
patents.org/bioshield2.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2009) (describing how the bill would eliminate
the five-year cap on a patent term restoration for time lost in regulatory review).
89. Id. § 113(d) ("In no case shall any extension granted under this section exceed 2 years, or
be less than 6 months.").
90. "Proponents... have asserted that the controversial wild card provision has been dropped
from their version of the bill." Light, supra note 88. However, "it's hard to predict which way a
court would interpret the provision" Id.
91. Senator Lieberman mentioned antibiotic-resistant bacteria as a bioterrorism threat during
committee hearings on the bill. See Creating a BioDefense Industry: BioShield II, Hearing on S.
975 Before the S. Comms. on the Judiciary and Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 109th
Cong. (Oct. 6, 2004) (testimony of Senator Joseph Lieberman) ("The Soviets apparently devel-
oped a strain of plague resistant to ten different antibiotics, and a strain of anthrax resistant to
seven different antibiotics."). Thus, an antibiotic that treats antibiotic-resistant infections could
be considered a countermeasure within the meaning of the legislation.
92. See http://govtrack.us/congressbill.xpd?bill=s109-975 (last visited Aug. 16, 2009) (indicat-
ing that S. 975 never became law).
93. S. 975, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005).
94. Id.
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search via a "wild-card" patent term extension.95 Under this proposal,
the patent holder for a novel antibiotic or counterterrorism agent
would receive a patent term extension that could be applied either to
the antibiotic, the counterterrorism agent, or any other patent held by
the patent owner. 96 The pharmaceutical company would contract with
the Department of Health and Human Services to develop the drug in
exchange for the patent term extension. 97 Thus, a pharmaceutical
company that successfully produced an antibiotic or counterterrorism
agent could apply the wild-card patent term extension to a patent of
its choice, such as a blockbuster drug.98 The wild-card patent term
extension would last from three months to two years.99
A hearing was held on the bill in July 2005.100 Generic pharmaceu-
tical companies, fearful of the impact that a wild-card patent term ex-
tension would have on their ability to market and sell generic drugs,
lobbied against the wild-card patent term extension provision of Pro-
ject BioShield 11.101 The companies argued that such measures would
"only delay consumers' access to affordable medicines. ' 10 2 Represen-
tative Henry Waxman also argued that the provision would allow a
pharmaceutical company to extend the patent of a blockbuster drug
for two years as a result of developing a "third-line treatment of a
minor side effect of an anthrax vaccine. ' 10 3 After the initial hearing,
no further action was taken on the bill.104 A similar bill was intro-
duced in 2006 that omitted a wild-card extension. 10 5
95. Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 167.
96. Id.
97. See Preparing a National Biodefense: Hearing on S. 975 Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. (statement of Sen. Lieberman) ("At some point the
Secretary of [the Department of Health and Human Services] will say, OK, what are you work-
ing on with regard to a countermeasure for a bioterrorist .... But you only get the patent bonus
if the countermeasure, an effective countermeasure is delivered.").
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Press Release, Generic Pharm. Ass'n, GPhA: New Bioterrorism Bill Would Bust
Health Care Budgets, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro-stories.pl?ACCT=913120&
TICK=GPHA&STORY=/sww/story/04-29-2005/0003494723&EDATE=apr+29,+2005. (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2008).
102. Id.
103. Generic Pharmaceutical Companies Oppose Proposed Amendment to BioShield HI Legis-
lation, USA, MED. NEWS TODAY, Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articies/
20494.php. (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
104. See http://govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-975 (last visited Oct. 15, 2008). A simi-
lar bill, S. 2564, was introduced in 2006 that omitted a wild-card extension, but no action was
taken on S. 2564 after it was referred to committee. S. 2564, 109th Cong. (2006); RAMANAN
LAXMINARAYAN & ANUP MALANI, EXTENDING THE CURE 148 (2007); http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2564 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
105. S. 2564, 109th Cong. (2006); LAXMINARAYAN & MALANI, supra note 104, at 148.
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In addition to the two patent term extension proposals discussed
above, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced the Medical Innovation
Prize Act of 2007.106 The bill proposed that a drug developer receive
a cash reward for a medical innovation in lieu of the traditional patent
monopoly right. 10 7 Congress never acted upon this bill.108
In conclusion, antibiotic resistance is a serious and growing prob-
lem. As bacteria can quickly evolve to combat the antibiotics used to
fight the bacteria, the widespread use of antibiotics causes antibiotic
resistance, and the overuse of antibiotics exacerbates it. While the
rise in antibiotic resistance has accentuated the need for novel antibi-
otics that can effectively treat antibiotic-resistant infections, the devel-
opment of such novel antibiotics has stagnated, as antibiotic
development offers little profit potential in comparison to drugs that
treat chronic illnesses.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, the Orphan Drug Act, and the Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act do not specifically reward or en-
courage antibiotic development. Recent legislation sought to en-
courage the development of certain types of drugs and
countermeasures-including antibiotics-via extending the patent
term for the countermeasure or drug, extending the patent term of
another patent owned by the pharmaceutical company that developed
the drug or counter measure, or by offering a patent prize in lieu of a
typical patent term. As will be discussed, these proposals would not
likely work because altering patent law is not the way to encourage
antibiotic development.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the problems associated with using the patent
system to prevent antibiotic resistance and to encourage the develop-
ment of novel antibiotics. This Part also addresses the probable ef-
fects of recent proposals that extend the patent term or institute a
patent prize system. Section A analyzes the patent bargain's relation-
ship to antibiotic resistance, and it explains how the patent term un-
dermines efforts to minimize antibiotic resistance. 10 9 Section B
discusses and critiques recent patent law modifications that were in-
106. S. 2210, 110th Cong. (2007).
107. See Knowledge Ecology Int'l, Experts Comment on Senate Bill that Replaces Monopolies
for Medicines with System of Prizes, KEI ONLINE, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.keionline.org/index.
php?option=com-content&task=view&id=150 (last visited Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Experts
Comment).
108. See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-2210 (last visited Nov. 10 2008).
109. See infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text
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tended to prevent antibiotic resistance and encourage novel antibiotic
development. 10 Section C examines the incompatibility of the patent
law system with the the scientifically optimal methods that limit and
prevent antibiotic resistance."'
A. Patent Law and Antibiotic Resistance
Patent law exacerbates the problems of antibiotic resistance for the
following reasons: (1) the patent bargain does not function effectively
with respect to antibiotics, (2) the antibiotic developer has little incen-
tive to minimize antibiotic resistance, and (3) the patent term itself is
incompatible with the optimal use of antibiotics.
1. The Patent Bargain and Antibiotic Resistance
The patent bargain affects antibiotics differently than other inven-
tions. The patent system is predicated on a quid pro quo between an
inventor and society.112 To illustrate, the inventor discloses his inven-
tion to the public, and in exchange, the government grants the inven-
tor a limited period of market exclusivity for the invention.11 3 The
public benefits from the disclosure once the patent application is pub-
lished,114 and it benefits from the invention itself after the patent term
has expired. However, bacteria can quickly grow resistant to antibiot-
ics,'1 5 and it may even become resistant before the antibiotic patent
110. See infra notes 136-237 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 245-264 and accompanying text.
112. See Andrew W. Torrance, An Extinction Bar to Patentability, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 237, 238 (2008). Torrance notes,
At the heart of the patent bargain lies a vital quid pro quo: in return for granting a
patentee a limited monopoly right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offer-
ing to sell, or importing a patentee's claimed invention,' the patent must provide the
public with new and useful information ....
Id.
113. See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue-Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 309, 312 (2007) ("To justify receipt of monopoly rights in an invention an
inventor must provide society with full disclosure of that invention to 'add to society's store-
house [of knowledge]."') (quoting In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Bald-
win, J., concurring)).
114. Patent applications are typically published eighteen months after filing. Press Release,
United States Patent & Trademark Office, UPSTO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applications,
Nov. 27, 2000, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comlspeeches/00-72.htm. (last vis-
ited Jan. 10, 2009).
115. One species of bacteria, Neisseria gonorrhoeae, was once effectively treated by an antibi-
otic. Nine years after the antibiotic became widely used, antibiotic-resistant strains became in-
creasingly common. See Susan A. Wang et al., Antibiotic Resistance for Neisseria gonorrhoeae,
1988 to 2003: The Spread of Fluoroquinolone Resistance, 147 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 81, 81
(2007).
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expires. 116 If the antibiotic is ineffective by the time the patent ex-
pires, the public might not reap the benefit of the invention.
However, it is possible that an antibiotic may benefit the public
even if the antibiotic is ineffective when the patent expires because
the inventor's disclosure may lead to the development of future gener-
ations of antibiotics. 117 Future generation antibiotics can be valuable
because they may be more effective against a wider spectrum of bacte-
ria than the first generation antibiotic. 1 8 Unfortunately, bacteria that
are resistant to a first generation antibiotic will often also be resistant
to future generation antibiotics.119 Therefore, a pharmaceutical com-
pany would be unlikely to invest in the development of future genera-
tion antibiotics because they may quickly become ineffective and
unprofitable if bacteria are resistant to the first generation antibi-
otic.1 20 If this occurs, the public does not reap the benefit of the in-
ventor's disclosure because the first generation antibiotic is
ineffective, and the public loses the opportunity to get a safer, more
effective future generation antibiotic. Some experts believe that there
is a finite number of antibiotics available in nature.121 If so, the phar-
maceutical company's refusal to invest in future generation antibiotics
deprives the public of one of a limited number of antibiotics.
2. The Patent Term is Incompatible with the Optimal Use of
Antibiotics
The antibiotic developer, often a private corporation, has an incen-
tive to maximize its economic benefit despite any negative effect on
antibiotic resistance.122 Because the patent term is set at twenty years
116. Resistance can become widespread in as little as nine years. See id. If the novel antibi-
otic is used to treat bacterial infections soon after the antibiotic is developed, and if resistance
begins to develop immediately, and if the patent is applied for at the time it was developed, then
bacteria may become resistant within nine years after applying for the patent. Thus, resistance
would develop even before the basic twenty-year statutory patent term expires.
117. See Spellberg et al., supra note 44, at 1282 (discussing the advantages of developing new
drugs within an existing class).
118. "The development of new drugs within an existing class may also provide incremental
improvement in antimicrobial spectrum .... Id.
119. Cf. Outterson, supra note 25, at 96 ("Class resistance also weakens future members of
the class still in the drug development pipeline.").
120. "The more rapidly pathogens develop resistance and thus render new drugs ineffective,
the smaller the potential market for those drugs." Aiello et al., supra note 11, at 1911. If the
first generation antibiotic is ineffective because of antibiotic resistance and the next generation
antibiotic would likely also be ineffective because of antibiotic resistance, there would be a very
small potential market for the next generation antibiotic, and the antibiotic would be
unprofitable.
121. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 68 ("Some pharmaceutical knowledge is therefore ex-
haustible .... ).
122. Id. at 84.
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from the date that the patent application was filed, the antibiotic de-
veloper has a limited period of time to profit from the antibiotic, let
alone to recoup the expenses from research and commercialization.
To profit from an antibiotic, the developer would likely market the
drug immediately upon FDA approval and heavily advertise the drug
to promote its use. These actions are likely to contribute to antibiotic
resistance. Marketing the antibiotic immediately upon FDA approval
gives the developer the most time to profit within the limited patent
term.123 However, from a public health perspective, the best way to
utilize a novel antibiotic may be to delay its use until existing antibiot-
ics are no longer effective. 124 Nonetheless, the developer is financially
motivated to market the drug immediately, in part because of the lim-
ited patent term.125 While widespread use of an antibiotic maximizes
profit, the overuse of antibiotics is one of the main causes of antibiotic
resistance.12 6 Thus, in attempting to maximize profit, the antibiotic
developer encourages the overuse of the antibiotic and increases the
likelihood of antibiotic resistance.
An antibiotic developer should be encouraged to prevent antibiotic
resistance. However, the patent term discourages developers from
combating antibiotic resistance. 27 The developer will not be able to
maximize profit from the antibiotic once the patent has expired be-
cause generic competition drives down the price of the antibiotic.12 8
Accordingly, the developer has no incentive to ensure that the antibi-
123. Id. at 83-84.
124. See id. at 83 for a discussion of Pfizer's decision to bring dalbavancin, a new antibiotic, to
market immediately upon the drug's FDA approval, even though "best medical practices might
shelve dalbavancin for a long period of time until the social need is more compelling."
125. Id.
126. See Dan I. Andersson & Bruce R. Levin, The Biological Cost of Antibiotic Resistance, 2
CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 489, 489 (1999) ("[T]he evolution and spread of resistance
can be attributed to the use and overuse of antibiotics .... ); Ron Dagan et al., Will Reduction
of Antibiotic Use Reduce Antibiotic Resistance?, 25 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 981, 981
(2006) ("Antimicrobial drug use and abuse is a major contributor to the emergence of resistance
in respiratory pathogens."); Mainous et al., supra note 10, at 22 ("Overuse of antibiotics has
been linked to rates of antibiotic resistance.").
127. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 81 (analogizing the waste that is likely to occur when a
limited time period exists on a lease of real property to the waste that occurs from a limited
patent term).
128. See John B. Horowitz & H. Brian Hoehring, How Property Rights and Patents Affect
Antibiotic Resistance, 13 HEALTH ECON. 575, 580 (2004) ("Antibiotic resistance tends to increase
when a patent on an antibiotic expires. Since new companies can now produce and distribute
the antibiotic, more of the antibiotic is produced and prices fall."); Outterson, supra note 25, at
82-83 (explaining that Pfizer plans to bring a novel antibiotic to market sooner than may be
socially beneficial because Pfizer's patent for Zithromax, a blockbuster antibiotic, is expiring
soon).
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otic is useful in the long run. 2 9 While it would be in the public's inter-
est to encourage the conservation of novel antibiotics, it is not in the
antibiotic developer's financial interest to encourage conservation
during the patent term.130
For some bacteria, such as extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis 131
and vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus,132 few if any antibiotics are
effective.1 33 If a pharmaceutical company developed an antibiotic that
was effective against these bacteria, it would be most beneficial from a
public health perspective to "save" the antibiotic for these infections
and not to use it on bacteria that can be effectively treated by other
antibiotics. 134 However, the pharmaceutical company has no incen-
tive to save the antibiotic for these extremely resistant infections. If
the antibiotic is effective against a wide spectrum of bacteria and if it
is easy to administer and tolerate, the pharmaceutical company would
profit by promoting its extensive use. 135
B. Altering Patent Law is Unlikely to Solve the Problems of
Antibiotic Resistance
There are two ways to approach the problem of antibiotic resis-
tance: (1) stimulate research and development of novel antibiotics,
and (2) conserve antibiotics. 136 Both strategies need to be imple-
129. Id. at 82.
130. Id. at 83-84.
131. See Mario Raviglione, Editorial, XDR-TB: Entering the Post-Antibiotic Era?, 10 INT'L J.
TUBERCULOSIS LUNG DISEASES 1185, 1185 (2006).
132. See Steven J. Brickner & Shahriar Mobashery, Prospects of Therapies Targeting Resistant
Bacteria-New Challenges 20 Years Post Emergence of Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococcus, 10
CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 425, 425 (2007) ("[Vlancomycin-resistant enterococcus]
cause difficult-to-treat and often life-threatening infections .... ").
133. See id. ("[M]edical practitioners have increasingly come to encounter more significant
treatment challenges brought on by the rising incidence of... problematic multi-drug resistant
infections .... "); Projan & Bradford, supra note 49, at 441 (2007) ("In fact, untreatable, pan-
resistant bacterial infections do occur and are becoming increasingly common.").
134. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 83 (discussing Pfizer's decision to market a new antibi-
otic, dalbavancin, immediately upon FDA approval, even though "best medical practices might
shelve dalbavancin for a long period of time until the social need is more compelling."); cf. BAD
BUGS, supra note 9, at 17 ("[Ilnfectious disease physicians and other public health experts often
hold new antibiotics in reserve, hoping to avoid fostering the rapid emergence of resistant bacte-
ria and saving them for when they are most needed.").
135. See id. at 84, discussing Tygacil/tigacycline, a "novel, wide spectrum antibiotic," and Wy-
eth, the antibiotic developer of Tygacil/tigacycline, as well as Wyeth's "difficult choice between
pressures to market Tygacil aggressively and the clinical demands of global EPK conservation."
Outterson further notes that "[t]he best medical approach for tigecycline might be to hold it
completely off the market for many years, except for true emergency situations where no other
drug would work. Expecting Wyeth to do so voluntarily seems too much." Id.
136. See id. at 68.
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mented in order to combat antibiotic resistance. 137 Recent proposals
to stall antibiotic resistance include: (1) extending the patent term for
antibiotics, 138 (2) granting a wild-card patent term extension to the
developer of a novel drug, 139 and (3) awarding a monetary "prize" to
the developer of a novel antibiotic in lieu of the traditional patent
right of exclusivity. 40
1. Extending the Patent Term
Laws such as the Hatch-Waxman Act 141 and the Best Pharmaceuti-
cals for Children Act 142 allow the extension of the patent term for
pharmaceutical inventions in certain circumstances. Commentators
have suggested that extending the patent term for antibiotics may en-
courage pharmaceuticals to conserve antibiotic efficacy. 143 However,
this Section argues to the contrary. 144
a. Previous Laws Extending the Patent Term Have Not Resulted
in Increased Antibiotic Development
Both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCA lengthen the patent
term for certain pharmaceutical patents,145 while the Orphan Drug
Act grants a seven-year market exclusivity for a qualifying drug. 146
These Acts do not differentiate between antibiotics and other types of
drugs.147 Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Or-
phan Drug Act, antibiotic development has slowed dramatically 148 be-
137. Id. at 68-69.
138. See Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 611, 652 (2005).
139. See Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 167.
140. See Experts Comment, supra note 106.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2006).
143. Kades, supra note 138, at 646.
144. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 70-75, 79-83 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
147. See 21 U.S.C. § 355A(b)(1) (instructing the Secretary to make a written request for pedi-
atric studies if "information relating to the use of a new drug in the pediatric population may
produce health benefits in that population" without distinguishing between antibiotics and other
drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (defining a "rare disease or condition" under the Orphan Drug Act as
"any disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or (B)
affects more than 200,000 and for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of
developing and making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be
recovered from sales in the United States of such drug," the definition of which does not distin-
guish between antibiotics and other drugs); Glover, supra note 74, at 2 (explaining that the
"FDAMA eliminated th[e] distinction between antibiotics and other drugs" in Hatch-Waxman
provision eligibility).
148. See supra notes 75, 78 and accompanying text.
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cause antibiotics "produce a weak return on investment for
manufacturers" 149 in comparison to other types of drugs. Because the
Hatch Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act do not differentiate
between antibiotics and other drugs,150 they offer no incentive to de-
velop antibiotics in lieu of, or in addition to, more profitable drugs.
However, the BPCA has successfully encouraged pharmaceutical
companies to conduct pediatric tests.151 The studies conducted under
the BPCA demonstrated the different effects that drugs have on chil-
dren, 152 and they resulted in valuable labeling changes.' 53 Pediatric
drug testing may be particularly important for antibiotics because bac-
terial infections disproportionately affect young children. 154 While
such testing may be worthwhile, it would not spur additional antibiotic
development because it is designed to encourage testing drugs for
children, rather than developing new drugs.
b. Extending the Patent Term for Antibiotics is Unlikely to
Encourage Conservation
Bacteria can develop resistance to antibiotics very quickly. 155 Many
bacteria develop resistance in time periods of less than the twenty-
year statutory patent term. 56 Thus, an antibiotic may be ineffective
before the statutory patent term expires.' 57 Therefore, a patent term
extension would have little economic value to an antibiotic developer,
and a patent term extension is highly unlikely to encourage the devel-
opment of novel antibiotics.
149. BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 16.
150. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
151. See Krista Conger, What Would Goldilocks Do?, 22 STAN. MED. MAG. 18, 20-21 (2005).
152. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEDIATRIC DRUG RESEARCH: STUDIES CON-
DUCTED UNDER BEST PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT 16 (2007), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07557.pdf (last visited July 10, 2009) ("Pediatric drug studies con-
ducted under BPCA showed that children may have been exposed to ineffective drugs, ineffec-
tive dosing, overdosing, or side effects that were previously unknown.").
153. Id.
154. See Naushaba Degani et al., Invasive Bacterial Diseases in Northern Canada, 14 EMERG-
ING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 34, 37 (2008).
155. See Aiello et al., supra note 11, at 2 ([Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus] in par-
ticular has exhibited a "stealth" ability to quickly adapt and acquire new antibiotic resistance
traits."); Wang et al., supra note 115, at 81.
156. Neisseria gonorrhoeae developed antibiotic resistance in nine years. Id.
157. Exposure to an antibiotic in pre-clinical and clinical testing creates a selective pressure
on bacteria to resist the antibiotic. See Mainous, supra note 10, at 28 (discussing how the use of
antibiotics creates a selective pressure that contributes to resistance). Because this selective
pressure begins when bacteria are exposed to the antibiotic, bacteria may start developing resis-
tance once such testing begins, which often occurs near the beginning of the patent term. See
BAD BuGs, supra note 9, at 19 ("Most patents are filed during the pre-clinical phase [of research
and development].").
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Commentators, such as Eric Kades, have suggested that extending
the patent term may encourage antibiotic conservation. 158 Kades be-
lieves that if antibiotic patents had longer terms, pharmaceutical com-
panies would be likely to promote antibiotic conservation so that the
antibiotic remains effective for a longer time.159 Kades assumes that
an antibiotic developer would "initially price the good higher than op-
timal, and will stretch out the useful life of the resource."'' 60 However,
even if this assumption were true, a pharmaceutical company may be
more concerned with its short-term financial health than long-term
financial possibilities, in which case it "might still be tempted to sell
more now rather than later. ' 161 Thus, even if a longer patent term
could result in a long-term financial benefit, that benefit may be insuf-
ficient to encourage conservation. Furthermore, bacteria can develop
resistance quickly, even if the antibiotic is carefully conserved.162 If
the antibiotic becomes ineffective before the original patent term ex-
pires, the pharmaceutical company will not financially benefit from
either the patent extension or the antibiotic's conservation.
c. Additional Problems with Extending Patent Terms
Altering patent law would pose additional problems to improving
healthcare for those suffering from antibiotic-resistant infections, even
if it were an effective means of conserving antibiotics. A longer pat-
ent term results in a longer period of market exclusivity for the paten-
tee. 163 Thus, potential competitors would be unable to market any
product involving the patented technology until that longer patent
term expired, and a potential competitor would be discouraged from
researching the patented technology until a later time.164 Theoreti-
158. See Kades, supra note 138, at 652.
159. Id.
160. Id. Kades' argument continues,
For antibiotics, this means that a monopolist will price out of the market some moder-
ate-value consumers, such as a patient with a painful but not serious bacterial infection.
This is the cost of monopoly. The benefit is that the patent holder will maintain the
utility of the drug for a longer-than-optimal time. If society is risk-averse, this is an
attractive trade-off. Granting antibiotic inventors very long-term patents trades off
some short-term moderate pain in return for ensuring the ability to treat the most seri-
ous illnesses further into the future.
Id.
161. Outterson, supra note 25, at 104.
162. See Brickner & Mobashery, supra note 132, at 425.
163. See Kades, supra note 138, at 644-46.
164. Under the statutory "experimental use" exception, a pharmaceutical company may con-
duct research on a patented drug without liability to the patentee, so long as that research is
reasonably related to the "development and submission of information under ... Federal law."
Merch KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (citing 35 U.S.C.
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cally, research would lead to future generation antibiotics that are
safer and more effective than the first generation antibiotic.165 How-
ever, if potential competitors cannot market any improvement of the
antibiotic until the extended patent term expires, potential competi-
tors would be unlikely to research such improvements until the pat-
ented time was coming to an end.
In addition to discouraging further research, extending the patent
term would also place a burden on those who need the affordable
generic antibiotics that are produced after the patent term expires be-
cause many people in the United States lack financial access to expen-
sive drugs. 166 Many people around the world would also be adversely
affected by long patent terms.167 For example, pharmaceutical com-
panies that are concerned about the therapeutic effectiveness of their
patent-protected antibiotics have demonstrated a reticence to donate
or reduce the prices of antibiotics below the marginal cost of produc-
tion for those in developing nations.1 68 Thus, if the patent term was
extended, these people would lack access to those antibiotics for an
even longer period of time.169
Moreover, if a patent term extension would effectively prompt
pharmaceutical companies to develop novel antibiotics, there would
be many additional adverse effects. Generic pharmaceutical compa-
nies would be unable to sell generic versions of the patented drug dur-
ing the patent term extension period. Without competition from
generic pharmaceutical companies, the antibiotic developer would
charge more for the patented drugs.' 70 Insurance companies would
bear the additional costs of covering the expensive brand name drugs
for an extended period, and they would pass on the increased costs to
consumers via increased fees, deductibles, and co-pays. Ultimately,
the public would pay the price for patent term extensions.
§ 271(e)(1) (2000)) (noting that the statutory experimental use exception applies to tests that are
required for FDA approval, as well as pre-clinical tests, both of which may be submitted for
FDA approval even though submission is not required).
165. See Spellberg et al., supra note 44, at 1282.
166. Peter J. Cunningham, Affording Prescription Drugs: Not Just a Problem for the Elderly 4
(Ctr. for Studying Health System Change, Research Report No. 5, 2002), available at http://
www.hschange.org/CONTENT/430/430.pdf ("About 23 million American adults-or 12 percent
of the adult population-could not afford to get at least one prescription medication in the past
year,"); see id. at 10 ("[P]olicymakers should not ignore the difficulties that many nonelderly
adults have in affording prescription medications.").
167. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 87-88.
168. Id. at 87-88.
169. Id. at 73.
170. In fact, this is the reason that patent term extensions would encourage pharmaceutical
companies to develop novel antibiotics.
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2. Wild-Card Patent Term Extensions
A wild-card patent term extension would allow the pharmaceutical
company to apply a patent term extension to any of its patented
pharmaceuticals. 171. The Project BioShield II Act of 2005 attempted
to use a wild-card patent term extension to encourage pharmaceutical
companies to develop products that counter terrorism. 172 Some com-
mentators argued that this wild-card patent term extension would re-
sult in long-term societal savings of approximately $4.6 billion 173
because antibiotic-susceptible infections are less expensive to treat
than antibiotic-resistant infections. 174 However, a wild-card patent
term extension may not save society as much as predicted. Suggested
modifications of wild-card patent term proposals may not prove effec-
tive, and they may actually do more harm than good.
a. Society Is Unlikely to Save Money from a Wild-Card Patent
Term Extension
In his 2004 article, Brad Spellberg predicts that wild-card patent
term extensions would save society money. His predictions are based
on a hypothetical novel drug that could treat drug-resistant
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, one particular bacterium. 175 Spellberg ba-
ses his calculations on a hypothetical new antibiotic that would reduce
the cost of antibiotic-resistant infection by fifty percent. 176 However,
the actual savings that would result from such an antibiotic are un-
clear.177 For example, strains resistant to current antibiotics may also
be resistant to the novel antibiotic.178 In that case, there would be no
societal benefit to the novel antibiotic because the novel antibiotic
would not effectively treat the resistant infection. 179 In addition,
Spellberg estimates that a wild-card patent extension would be cost-
171. See Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 167.
172. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
173. Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 167.
174. Id. at 170.
175. Id. at 168.
176. Id. at 170.
177. Id. at 167.
178. "Resistance may develop against a particular mode of action rather than to a specific
patented molecule." Outterson, supra note 25, at 95. If the bacterium is resistant to the mode of
action, and the existing antibiotic and the novel antibiotic have the same mode of action, the
bacterium may be resistant to the novel antibiotic.
179. In addition, treating a resistant infection may be more expensive with a novel antibiotic
than with an existing antibiotic. If the existing antibiotic is off-patent, it is presumably cheaper
than the novel antibiotic. Thus, there would be no savings generated from the use of the novel
antibiotic, and treating the resistant infection with the novel antibiotic would be more expensive
than using the existing antibiotic because the novel antibiotic would cost more than the existing
drug.
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neutral in ten years, 180 but bacteria may develop resistance before
then.181 Thus, society may not benefit from a wild-card patent exten-
sion to the extent that Spellberg predicts.
Spellberg may have also overestimated the financial benefit of a
wild-card patent term extension to a pharmaceutical company that de-
velops a novel antibiotic. Spellberg bases his sales prediction of a
novel antibiotic on the average "[s]ales of on-patent drugs with activ-
ity against P. aeruginosa."'1 82 However, seven of the eight antibiotics
are broad-spectrum antibiotics, 183 meaning that they work against a
number of different bacteria. 184 Broad-spectrum antibiotics are con-
sidered financially beneficial for the pharmaceutical company 185 be-
cause these antibiotics can be used against infections caused by many
different bacteria, and thus, pharmaceutical companies can sell
more.186 Because broad spectrum antibiotics are more profitable than
180. Spellberg estimates that ten years after the antibiotic is approved the costs of the exten-
sion (from higher prices of another drug for two years added to the patent term) will equal
societal savings from the extension. Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 170.
181. As previously discussed, antibiotic-resistant strains have emerged as soon as nine years
after the antibiotic was introduced. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Because clinical
testing exposes the antibiotic to bacteria before the drug is approved, resistance may develop
sooner than ten years after the antibiotic is approved.
182. Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 171 tbl.3.
183. Of the eight on-patent drugs listed by Spellberg for treating Pseudomonas aeruginosa
infections, seven have broad-spectrum activity, or extended-spectrum activity. See George L.
Arnold et al., Preliminary Study of Ciprofoxacin in Active Crohn's Disease, 8 INFLAMMATORY
BOWEL DISEASES 10, 10 (2002) (classifying ciprofloxacin as a broad-spectrum antibiotic); D.A.
Pastel, Imipenem-Cilastatin Sodium, a Broad-Spectrum Carbapenem Antibiotic Combination, 5
CLINICAL PHARMACY 719, 719 (1986) (classifying imipenem as a broad-spectrum antibiotic); D.
Raveh et al., Prospective Drug Utilization of Three Broad-Spectrum Antimicrobials: Cefepime,
Piperacillin-Tazobactam and Meropenem, 99 QJM: INT'L J. MED. 397, 397 (2006) (classifying
cefepime, piperacillin-tazobactam, and meropenem as broad-spectrum antibiotics); Mitchell J.
Schwaber et al., Treatment with a Broad-Spectrum Cephalosporin Versus Piperacillin- Tazobactam
and the Risk for Isolation of Broad-Spectrum Cephalosporin-Resistant Enterobacter Species, 47
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1882, 1883 (2003); (classifying ceftazidime as a
broad-spectrum cephalosporin); S. Swoboda et al., Tissue and Serum Concentrations of Levoflox-
acin 500 mg Administered Intravenously or Orally for Antibiotic Prophylaxis in Biliary Surgery,
51 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 459, 459 (2003) (classifying levofloxacin as a broad-spec-
trum antibiotic). The sole non-broad spectrum antibiotic, aztreonam, sold much less well than
the seven broad-spectrum antibiotics. See Ella Westle-Horton & James A. Koestner, Aztreonam:
A Review of the First Monobactam, 302 AM. J. MED. SCI. 46, 46 (1991) (classifying aztreonam as
a narrow-spectrum antibiotic). In 2003, sales of aztreonam totaled $20 million, compared to
average sales of $500 million for all eight antibiotics; sales of levofloxacin and ciprofloxacin, the
highest selling antibiotics, were $1.6 billion and $1 billion respectively. Spellberg et al., supra
note 5, at 171 tbl.3.
184. See BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 15.
185. See Carl Nathan & Frederick M. Goldberg, The Profit Problem in Antibiotic R&D, 4
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 887, 888 (2005).
186. See BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 15.
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other antibiotics, a sales average based on those antibiotics is inflated
and misleading.
Additionally, broad-spectrum antibiotics "are more likely to con-
tribute to the development of resistance. ' 187 Hypothetically, if a
newly developed antibiotic exhibits broad-spectrum activity, a phar-
maceutical company may benefit as Spellberg expects. However, bac-
teria may develop resistance to that broad-spectrum antibiotic more
quickly than it would to a narrow-spectrum antibiotic.1 88 Society may
not benefit as predicted if bacterial resistance increases healthcare
costs by rendering antibiotics ineffective.
In another scenario, the hypothetical antibiotic may exhibit narrow-
spectrum activity. As previously mentioned, broad-spectrum antibiot-
ics are more likely to contribute to resistance than narrow-spectrum
antibiotics. Thus, a narrow-spectrum antibiotic may more effectively
treat antibiotic-resistant infections. Accordingly, society might realize
its expected savings if the antibiotic can reduce costs as predicted.
However, the pharmaceutical company may not profit as expected be-
cause the narrow-spectrum antibiotic would presumably sell poorly189
in comparison to a broad-spectrum antibiotic. Thus, pharmaceutical
companies would be less likely to develop and commercialize a nar-
row-spectrum antibiotic. 190
Moreover, Spellberg calculated the societal costs of a patent term
extension by analyzing the costs associated with the sales of a new
antibiotic and the sales of a patented blockbuster drug that accrued
over a two-year period. 191 This analysis ignores that the wild-card pat-
ent term extension may be less than two years, and if SO,192 societal
costs resulting from the extension of the patent term for a blockbuster
187. Id.; see also Kades, supra note 138, at 618 ("[D]octors often prescribe 'wide-spectrum'
antibiotics-those that are active against many types of bacteria-when a narrower-spectrum
drug would suffice. This, of course, accelerates the spread of resistance to those antibiotics that
are useful in the greatest variety of cases, in effect wasting the effectiveness of a more valuable
drug.").
188. See BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 15.
189. See Nathan & Goldberg, supra note 185, at 888.
190. Proponents of wild-card patent term extensions think that pharmaceutical companies
would be motivated to develop an antibiotic regardless of the profit potential for the antibiotic in
order to obtain a patent term extension for a blockbuster drug. See LAXMINARAYAN & MALANI,
supra note 104, at 147 (assuming that a wild-card proposal would give pharmaceutical companies
an incentive to develop antibiotics that would be equal to the value of the wild-card patent term
extension, implying that the profit potential of the antibiotic would be insignificant). If this is
the case, then the inability to profit from the antibiotic does not significantly encourage antibi-
otic development.
191. Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 169 tbl.1.
192. Under the proposed Project BioShield Act, the patent term extension would last be-
tween six months and two years. S. 975, 109th Cong. § 301(b)(4)(A)(iv) (2005).
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drug would be less than predicted. 193 For example, the expensive
price of the blockbuster drug while protected by the patent may in-
hibit its mainstream use194 by patients who are unable to afford the
drug.
On the other hand, it is possible that society could reap a greater
benefit than Spellberg predicts.1 95 For example, if the antibiotic is ef-
fective against a number of antibiotic-resistant bacteria,1 96 society
could save additional healthcare costs from antibiotic-resistant infec-
tions caused by other bacteria. 197 Additionally, Spellberg did not take
into account indirect costs associated with drug resistant infection,
such as lost productivity 98 or long-term disability.199 Society could
receive a greater benefit than Spellberg estimated if these indirect
costs were taken into account.200 However, it is ultimately unclear
whether society would enjoy a net benefit even if the costs of the wild-
card patent term extension exceed Spellberg's predictions.
b. Suggested Modifications of Wild-Card Proposals
Advocates of a wild-card patent term extension have suggested a
number of modifications in response to criticism.201 The Infectious
Diseases Society of America (IDSA) has suggested (1) limiting the
types of drugs eligible for the wild-card patent term extension, 20 2 (2)
limiting the length of a patent term extension program,20 3 (3) requir-
ing a beneficiary pharmaceutical company to invest part of its profits
earned during the extension into antibiotic research and develop-
193. Cf Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 169 tbl.1 (taking into account only a "base-case
estimate for two years of sales based on mean annual sales of top ten selling drugs in the US").
194. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 99.
195. Cf. Spellberg et al., supra note 5, at 172 ("Given the conservative estimates in our base-
case model, the time to cost-neutrality of a single application of wild-card patent term extension
might occur years earlier than our estimates.").
196. Id. ("It is highly likely that a newly developed antibiotic capable of treating drug-resis-
tant P. aeruginosa would also possess activity against other related drug-resistant organisms.").
197. Id. ("Hence, reduction in the cost due to these other organisms would dramatically im-
prove the overall cost savings from implementation of the wild-card patent extension.").
198. Cf id. at 172 ("[W]e did not attempt to place a money value on ... lost wages and family
support from death, which would have increased the savings resulting from having a new antibi-
otic to treat multi-drug-resistant infections.").
199. Cf id.
200. Cf. id. (listing factors that "would have increased the savings resulting from having a new
antibiotic to treat multi-drug-resistant infections").
201. Letter from Infectious Diseases Soc'y of Am. to Senator Richard Burr, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Bioterrorism and Pub. Health, Senate Comm. on Health. Education, Labor & Pen-
sions (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.idsociety.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=3320
(last visited Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Letter].
202. Id.
203. Id.
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ment,20 4 and (4) establishing an independent commission to identify
only certain pathogens that threaten public health as eligible for the
wild-card patent term extension.20 5 Adopting these modifications
may appease the opponents of wild-card patent term extensions.
However, the resulting decrease in incentives would make any such
wild-card program unlikely to significantly spur antibiotic
development.
i. Limiting the types of eligible drugs
The IDSA proposes limiting the types of drugs eligible for the pat-
ent term extension,206 such as limiting the extension to "lifestyle
drugs. '20 7 This would ameliorate the concern that a longer patent
term would endanger the lives of those who may not be able to afford
potentially life-saving medications. 208 This modification would also
appease those who are concerned about the additional costs posed by
increasing the patent term of a blockbuster drug.20 9 However, the po-
tential of encouraging antibiotic development while limiting a wild-
card extension to lifestyle drugs is unclear. The market for lifestyle
drugs is predicted to continue growing. 210 Those predictions include
anti-depressants and weight-loss drugs.211 While these drugs may be
used as lifestyle drugs, they also treat serious medical problems. 212 If
a wild-card extension is limited to lifestyle drugs that don't treat a
medical disease, then it may not offer a sufficient incentive for antibi-
204. Id.
205. See BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 23.
206. Letter, supra note 201.
207. The Infectious Diseases Society of America does not define what it considers to be a
lifestyle drug. See BAD BuGs, supra note 9, at 16. A lifestyle drug can be defined as a
"medicine[] that treat[s] conditions associated with lifestyle such as weight-loss tablets, anti-
smoking agents, impotence therapies and hair restorers." Tim Atkinson, Lifestyle Drug Market
Booming, 8 NATURE MED. 909, 909 (2002). Lifestyle drugs have alternatively been defined as
drugs "taken in an attempt to increase personal well-being and quality of life" but not taken "to
manage a medically identifiable, well-defined disease." W. Harth et al., Lifestyle Drugs in Old
Age-A Mini-Review, 55 GERONTOLOGY 13, 13 (2009).
208. See Light, supra note 88.
209. Id.
210. Joel Lexchin, Bigger and Better: How Pfizer Redefined Erectile Dysfunction, 3 PLoS
MED. 429, 431 (2006), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1434
483&blobtype=pdf ("Drug companies have identified lifestyle drugs as a 'growth market."'); see
also Atkinson, supra note 207, at 909 ("[T]he current market lifestyle [sic] for drugs is forecast to
rise to over $29 billion by 2007 from its current $20 billion.").
211. Id.
212. Harth et al., supra note 207, at 14 ("Overweight [sic] represents a major medical problem
in our society. Orlistat and sibutramine are used to treat obese patients, but are used as lifestyle
drugs in subjects with normal body weight."); id. at 14-15 ("Psychopharmaceuticals ... are also
taken as lifestyle drugs.").
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otic development. If instead a wild-card extension could be applied to
drugs that treat a medical disease and have a lifestyle purpose, pa-
tients with a clinical need for such drugs may lack financial access to
them. Thus, limiting the drugs that are eligible for the extension may
significantly reduce the incentive for pharmaceutical companies to de-
velop antibiotics, and it may endanger patients who are unable to af-
ford potentially life-saving drugs protected by an extended patent.
ii. Limiting the duration of a program
The IDSA also suggests that Congress should limit the duration of a
wild-card patent term extension program to ten years.213 The IDSA
thinks this modification would allow Congress to reevaluate the pro-
gram's effectiveness and encourage pharmaceutical companies to
quickly begin antibiotic development.214 However, it is unlikely that
the effectiveness of this program could be successfully evaluated after
ten years. It takes an average of ten years for an antibiotic to reach
the market after its conception.215 Thus, after ten years, the first an-
tibiotics, if any, would just be reaching the market,216 and the benefits
of the antibiotics would remain unclear. In addition, the drug to
which the wild-card extension is applied may still be protected by its
original patent term. Consequently, the costs associated with the two-
year patent term extension would remain unknown. Therefore, a time
frame longer than ten years is necessary in order to accurately evalu-
ate the benefits and costs of a wild-card patent term extension.
iii. Requiring investment of patent extension profits
The IDSA suggests that Congress should require a pharmaceutical
company to invest some of its profits from the extended patent term
into antibiotic or countermeasure research and development.2 17 This
suggestion addresses the concern that a wild-card program would give
pharmaceutical companies a windfall.218 However, this modification
213. See Letter, supra note 201.
214. Id.
215. See BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 22.
216. An antibiotic developed under this program would need to be conceived of almost imme-
diately after the program is implemented in order to be on the market in ten years. It is unlikely
that antibiotic development would be this efficient. Also, any antibiotic that reaches the market
within ten years would probably be in development before the program is implemented. In this
case, the pharmaceutical company would not be influenced by financial incentive, and thus a
wild-card patent term extension would be a windfall. Furthermore, the program could not be
effectively evaluated based on development that occurred independently of the program.
217. See Letter, supra note 201.
218. See BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 24.
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would reduce the incentive for pharmaceutical companies to develop
antibiotics because it reduces the pharmaceutical companies' profits.
iv. Predetermining pathogens eligible for the wild-card patent term
extension
The IDSA suggests that Congress should establish a commission to
evaluate the health threats posed by different infectious diseases. 219
Those pathogens that the Commission identifies as serious health
threats would be eligible for incentives, such as the wild-card exten-
sion.220 This proposal would alleviate the concern that pharmaceuti-
cal companies would receive a patent term extension for minor
improvements or inconsequential developments. However, it may not
encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop antibiotics if it is too
difficult to develop a drug for those infectious diseases that are eligi-
ble for the program.
c. Additional Problems with the Project BioShield II Act of 2005
The language of the Project BioShield II Act of 2005221 conflicts
with the intentions of the Act's sponsor. A pharmaceutical company
that develops an approved countermeasure can elect an "eligible pat-
ent"222 to receive the patent term extension. Currently, the Act re-
quires the eligible patent to be owned or licensed by the
pharmaceutical company at the time when the pharmaceutical com-
pany entered into a contract to develop the countermeasure. 223 Thus,
a pharmaceutical company that develops countermeasures could
purchase or license a blockbuster drug from another pharmaceutical
company prior to entering into the contract and subsequently the
company could obtain up to a two-year patent term extension for that
blockbuster drug. However, Senator Lieberman, who introduced the
bill, stated that a pharmaceutical company "is eligible to extend the
term of any patent owned by the company for two years. The patent
may not be one that is acquired by the company from a third party. 224
219. Id. at 23.
220. Id.
221. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
222. An "eligible patent" is defined as "a patent that at the time the eligible entity entered
into the contract, was owned by or licensed to that eligible entity." S. 975, 109th Cong.
§ 158(a)(3) (2005).
223. When applying for the patent term extension, the pharmaceutical company must include
"information indicating that the entity owned or licensed the eligible patent at the time it en-
tered into the contract to develop the countermeasure product." § 158(c)(2)(F).
224. Creating a BioDefense Industry: Hearing on S. 975 Before the S. Comms. on the Judiciary
and on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 20 (2004) (statement of Senator Joseph
Lieberman) (emphasis added); see also Preparing a National Biodefense: Hearing on S. 975
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Thus, Lieberman's intent was to prevent such a scenario from occur-
ring, but that intent was not reflected in the Act's language. 22 5 While
the language could easily be amended to remedy this problem, the
current language would allow a pharmaceutical company to apply the
patent term extension to a licensed blockbuster drug that it did not
develop.
3. Patent Prizes
In 2007, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont proposed legislation to
award a cash reward to developers of a novel drug in lieu of the tradi-
tional monopoly patent right;226 this legislation is characterized as a
patent prize system. 227 Patent prizes separate the financial reward for
a successful drug from the market of the drug itself.2 28 The proposed
legislation would put 0.6% of the U.S. GDP-$80 billion in 2007-
into a medical innovation fund.229 Drug developers would receive a
discretionary portion of the fund for a medical innovation.230 The
drug would then enter the public domain so that it could be manufac-
tured and sold by other companies at a marginal cost, which would
decrease cost barriers to novel drugs.231 Therefore, the drug develop-
ers would derive profit from the government prize, rather than market
sales.
Presumably, patent prizes would also lessen the marketing tactics
employed by pharmaceutical companies. Currently, pharmaceuticals
Before the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness of the Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of Senator Joseph Lieberman)
(designating the patent term extension available under the Act "for existing patents in a com-
pany's portfolio").
225. Cf. LAXMINARAYAN & MALANI, supra note 104, at 148 ("At first they obtained a bar on
the sale of the wildcard extension (actually a bar to the acquisition of a company with a wildcard
extension).").
226. Press Release, Knowledge Ecology Int'l, Experts Comment on Senate Bill That Replaces
Monopolies for Medicines with Systems of Prizes (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://keion-
line.org/content/view/150/1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(18) (2007).
230. The amount of the prize is at the discretion of an appointed board that is responsible for
determining the amount of the prize, but the prize for any one invention cannot exceed five
percent of the total fund allocation for that year. Id. § 9(d)(4). At a minimum, four percent of
the fund must be used for "global neglected diseases," ten percent must be used for "orphan
drugs," and four percent must be used for "global infectious diseases and other global public
health priorities, including research on AIDS, AIDS vaccines, and medicines for responding to
bioterrorism." Id. § 10(b)(1)-(3).
231. Knowledge Ecology Int'l, supra note 226 ("By separating the markets for innovation
from the markets for physical goods, the Prize Fund would ensure that everyone, everywhere,
could have access to new medicines at marginal costs.").
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companies' profits are dependent upon the sales of their drugs. Con-
sequently, pharmaceutical companies aggressively market their drugs
to doctors. 232 Some commentators have suggested that "ending pat-
ent-based marketing monopolies would transform pharmaceutical
marketing practices and likely eliminate most abuses. ' 233 These
abuses include encouraging the off-label and untested use of prescrip-
tion drugs, which can have serious, if not fatal, consequences. 234
Those in favor of patent prizes predict that the system would en-
courage antibiotic development without rewarding excessive antibi-
otic use. 235 Because the drug developer's profit would not be related
to product sales, the developer would presumably have no incentive to
market the drug or encourage its overuse. Antibiotics would only be
used when needed, and antibiotic choice would be unaffected by
price. Ultimately, however, a patent prize system "would be undesir-
able for antibiotics. '236 Under a patent prize regime, all antibiotics
would presumably cost about the same price: the price of manufac-
ture. The low price for antibiotics would likely facilitate overuse. 237
In addition, if all antibiotics are similarly priced, doctors may pre-
scribe newer antibiotics that may be safer or easier for the patient to
tolerate in lieu of older but still effective antibiotics that would be
more advantageous from a public health perspective. This would un-
necessarily increase resistance to newer antibiotics.
One aspect of the Medical Innovation Act of 2007 is that for the
new innovation, the prize to be awarded under the Act is independent
of any underlying patent.238 Under this proposal, a patent would not
232. See Rob Weissman, Pharmaceutical Payola-Drug Marketing to Doctors, CORPWATCH,
May 22, 2008, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15044 (last visited Aug. 16, 2009); see
also Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 25, 2007, at 64 (describing how "tak-
ing pharmaceutical money can cloud your judgment).
233. See Weissman, supra note 232 (describing money that physicians take from pharmaceuti-
cal companies as "bribes").
234. See Mary Ebeling, Beyond Advertising: The Pharmaceutical Industry's Hidden Marketing
Tactics, http://www.prwatch.org/node/7026 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (describing television ad-
vertisements and articles that encourage the off-label use of injectable fillers and their potential
side effects, including death due to such off-label use).
235. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 91.
236. Kades, supra note 138, at 646.
237. Id. at 646-47 (arguing that a patent prize system would foster antibiotic resistance "be-
cause of the central problem ... [that] marginal cost pricing of antibiotics leads to excessive
use").
238. The bill states the following:
To be eligible to receive a prize payment under subsection (a) for medical innovation
relating to a drug, a biological product, or a new manufacturing process a person shall
be-
(1) in the case of a drug or biological product, the first person to receive market clear-
ance with respect to the drug or biological product; or
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be necessary to receive a prize payment.239 So long as a drug devel-
oper was the first to receive market clearance, that developer could
receive a drug prize.240 Because a valid patent would no longer be
necessary, developers could move their potential drugs through regu-
latory hurdles at whatever pace they choose, without the ticking clock
of an expiring patent to speed the drug to market. This may be disad-
vantageous if drug developers delay in bringing new drugs to market,
to the detriment of patients who could be treated with that new drug.
It would be far worse if such a system effectively discouraged drug
developers from filing for patents. Under the current system, a patent
applicant typically files a patent application early in the research and
development process.2 41 This is done as early as possible in order to
reduce the chance that another party will file or publish prior art that
could invalidate the patent application.2 42 Eighteen months later, that
application is published, and it provides information to the world
about the invention. 243 Other drug developers and researchers can
then use the information that was disclosed in the patent application
to make further discoveries or to delve into additional lines of re-
search. This is the quid pro quo upon which the patent system is
built.244 However, under the proposed prize system, there is no incen-
tive to disclose an innovation because the rewards from the innova-
tion (the prize) are no longer dependent on disclosing that innovation
(via a patent application). Drug developers would thus likely keep
their innovations secret, unless and until disclosure is necessary for
market clearance. If the innovation does not perform as anticipated
in early testing, later clinical testing would likely never begin, and the
innovation would never be disclosed. The innovation may be lost to
science forever, and an innovation that could pave the way to further
life-saving drugs may never be accessible to others. Thus, a proposal
that awards a prize for market clearance would discourage the dis-
losure of innovations.
(2) in the case of a manufacturing process, the holder of the patent with respect to such
process.
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(b) (2007).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 19 ("Most patents are filed during the pre-clinical phase.").
242. Mengfei Huang & Dennis Fernandez, Deadline Strategies for US Patent Applications,
http://www.iploft.com/deadlines%20article%203.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) ("Establishing
an early priority or filing date has strategic value by preventing the development of prior art
against the applicant's case from later publication or other disclosures.").
243. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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C. The Best Methods to Combat Antibiotic Resistance Are
Inconsistent with Patent Law
The best way to both slow the spread of antibiotic resistance and
effectively use existing antibiotics involves (1) closely regulating an-
tibiotic use,245 and (2) cycling the use of different antibiotics over
time.246 However, this would interfere with the rights of the antibiotic
patentee.2 47 If this method was used to combat antibiotic resistance, it
would undermine the goal of effectively treating bacterial infection by
failing to reward antibiotic innovation, and thus hampering future an-
tibiotic development.
1. Closely Regulating Antibiotic Use
The optimal way to stall the spread of antibiotic resistance and ef-
fectively use existing antibiotics involves closely regulating antibiotic
use.248 Antibiotic use could be closely regulated by a governmental
entity.249 Theoretically, the FDA could require pharmaceutical com-
panies to limit the sale of certain antibiotics to prevent antibiotic
overuse or institute more stringent requirements to obtain an antibi-
otic prescription.250 However, commentators doubt the efficacy and
sufficiency of such governmental regulations. 251 Even if such regula-
tions would be effective, closely regulating antibiotic use or cycling the
use of antibiotics would decrease the financial incentive for
pharmaceuticals to develop antibiotics. 252 Closely regulating the use
of antibiotics would cause fewer antibiotics to be sold,2 53 thereby re-
ducing pharmaceutical companies' profits. As previously discussed,
fewer antibiotics are currently being developed because they have a
smaller profit potential than other types of drugs.2 54 If pharmaceuti-
cal companies' profits are decreased because of antibiotic use regula-
245. See Dryden, supra note 26, at 887 ("[T]he only way is to have more, not less, regulation
of the use of antibiotics.").
246. Outterson, supra note 25, at 100.
247. See infra notes 248-260 and accompanying text.
248. See Dryden, supra note 26, at 887.
249. See Kades, supra note 138, at 637 ("Regulating antibiotics entails a strict limit on the
number of doses administered, or strict guidelines on use.").
250. See id. at 636 (listing the measures suggested by the Center for Science in the Public
Interest as including "requir[ing] tests to identify infectious agents before prescribing
antibiotics.").
251. See id. at 637-38 ("Given doctors' and patients' incentives, and the ease of lying about
the variety of infections being treated, monitoring prescriptions might prove insufficient.").
252. Cf. BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 17 ("[P]hysicians' efforts to preserve antibiotics for the
treatment of resistant infections serve as a disincentive to antibiotic discovery and
development.").
253. Id.
254. Id. at 15.
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tion, pharmaceutical companies would be even less likely to develop
novel antibiotics.
2. Cycling Antibiotic Use
Cycling the use of antibiotics is another strategy to counter antibi-
otic resistance.2 5 5 Cycling involves using a certain antibiotic until bac-
teria become resistant to it, and then switching to a different antibiotic
or class of antibiotics.25 6 Advocates hope that this would allow ex-
isting antibiotics to be used in an effective manner that minimizes re-
sistance.25 7 Under a cycling regime, the government would only
permit the production and sales of the chosen antibiotic until bacteria
became resistant, at which point a new antibiotic would be selected.258
A pharmaceutical company that developed a successful, novel antibi-
otic could not sell it until the current antibiotic became ineffective. 259
At that point, the antibiotic may or may not still have patent protec-
tion.260 If the pharmaceutical company is prohibited from selling the
antibiotic while it is patent protected, the novel antibiotic patent
owner essentially loses its patent term.
3. Close Regulation of Antibiotic Use or Cycling Antibiotics
While the goal of closely regulating and cycling antibiotic use is to
better conserve existing antibiotics, antibiotic conservation is insuffi-
cient in itself to counter the problems posed by bacterial infections. 261
Regardless of how carefully antibiotic use is regulated or how success-
ful the cycling program is, bacteria will still likely develop resistance to
the current supply of antibiotics. 262 Thus, new antibiotic development
will still be necessary in order to combat bacterial infections. 263 Addi-
tionally, closely regulating antibiotic use and cycling antibiotics would
discourage the development of novel antibiotics.264 Because antibi-
otic development is necessary to combat antibiotic resistance, conserv-
255. See Kades, supra note 138, at 620.
256. Id.
257. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 100.
258. See Kades, supra note 138, at 620.
259. Id.
260. If the newly developed antibiotic is not chosen for use before the patent expires, then
that antibiotic could only be sold once it enters the public domain (i.e., after the patent expires).
261. See Outterson, supra note 25, at 69.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Cf. BAD BuGs, supra note 9, at 17 ("[Plhysicians' efforts to preserve antibiotics for the
treatment of resistant infections serve as a disincentive to antibiotic discovery and
development.").
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ing antibiotics could actually undermine the goal of decreasing
antibiotic resistance.
V. IMPACT
Many of the solutions proposed to combat antibiotic resistance
would use patent-based incentives to encourage pharmaceutical com-
panies to develop novel antibiotics. However, as previously discussed,
these patent-based proposals would likely be ineffective. Commenta-
tors suggest alternative' proposals to stimulate antibiotic development,
including providing government research subsidies and providing tax
breaks.265 Similar to a patent prize proposal, these proposals aim to
"curb antibiotic use and at the same time spur innovation."2 66 These
proposals also pose problems. For a subsidy program, the antibiotic-
developing pharmaceutical company would be chosen before the an-
tibiotic is developed. 267 If a successful antibiotic is not developed,
then the government, tax-payers and those who would potentially
benefit from the antibiotic, would bear that burden.268 Even if an
award in the form of tax credits was used instead, it would only be
effective at spurring antibiotic development if the financial reward
provided the pharmaceutical company with a profit that made antibi-
otic development financially beneficial.
These problem would be best addressed by direct governmental ac-
tion, and not by indirectly encouraging private actors-such as phar-
maceutical companies-to change their behavior. Instead of merely
funding research and development at an early stage, the government
could also perform later-stage development and clinical testing, so
that it can develop antibiotics itself. Additionally, society could bene-
fit because the government could closely regulate the antibiotic or cy-
cle its use as appropriate. By closely regulating and cycling the
antibiotics that it develops itself, the government can preserve the use-
fulness of the antibiotic without facing political pressure from a phar-
maceutical company that hopes to profit from the antibiotic or
discouraging future antibiotic development. Thus, antibiotic develop-
ment would not depend on ensuring that pharmaceutical companies
profit from antibiotic development.
265. LAXMINARAYAN & MALANI, supra note 104, at 148.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 149.
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V. CONCLUSION
Antibiotic resistance is a serious threat to public health. Countering
this threat requires the conservation of existing antibiotics and the de-
velopment of new antibiotics. However, the patent system does not
encourage conservation, and it does not spur the development of new
antibiotics. The proposals seeking to extend the patent term would
not function as anticipated by their proponents. The anticipated ben-
efit-increased antibiotic development-is likely overestimated. Pat-
ent law should not be used to spur antibiotic development. Instead,
the government should directly develop antibiotics itself.
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